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The supply of formal agricultural loans in many low-income countries has 
expanded very rapidly in the past few years. Sone countries have experienced 
increases of 50 to 100 percent in a single year. In nnst cases these funds 
have been ained at facilitating increases in agricultural output. Many gov-
ernnents, along with various aid agencies, have also attempted to direct a 
sizable portion of these additional funds to the rural poor [l, 11]. A nurrber 
of country cases can be identified which indicate that aug]!Ented credit sup-
plies have supported product output increases, but it is becoming increasingly 
apparent that relatively little of the additional loanable funds have gone to 
the rural poor [4, 6, 10]. 
At least three explanations have been offered for the continued lack of 
formal credit use among nnst of the rural poor. 1 Lipton, for ex.a.rrple, views 
the problem as the result of class struggle. He feels that the economically 
powerful conspire against the poor and deny them access to significant amounts 
of formal credit. Gonzalez-Vega provides an alternative explanation which 
focuses on supply allocation problems within financial institutions. · He argues 
that widely used concessional interest rate policies, combined with relatively 
* Professor of Agricultural Economics, the Ohio State University and Agricul-
tural Economist with the Agency for International ~velopment in Paraguay 
respectively. The Agency for International ~velopnent provided part of 
the support for this study. 
1 Formal credit is defined as funds coming from banks, cooperatives and other 
officially recognized financial institutions. 
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large lender loan transaction costs for servicing sma.11 or new borrowers, 
discourage financial institutions from lending more to the rural poor. Many 
other people present a third explanation which focuses on limited credit de-
ma.nd among the rural poor. 'Ibey argue that many poor do not seek formal 
credit because they lack profitable investrrEnt opportunities, are not aware 
of the availability of formal credit,· do not know how to use formal credit, 
or are too timid to request formal loans. 
Clearly, all three of these explanations are at least partially valid 
in many low-incorrE countries. We feel, however, that a fourth explanation, 
not previously discussed, may also shed a good deal of light on why most 
rural financial ma.rkets do so poorly in providing credit services to the 
rural poor. Our explanation focuses on differences in borrowing costs·amJng 
various types of formal borrowers. We argue that these differential borrow-
ing costs strongly affect the willingness of the rural poor to seek loans 
from formal lenders. We draw on data from several low-income countries to 
support this argunent. 
Borrowing Costs 
Most credit dema.nd analyses equate the nominal rate of interest charged 
on a loan with the price of the loan. We feel this assumption is often in-
appropriate when one tries to analyze rural borrowing behavior in low-income 
countries. We suggest that a more appropriate "price of credit" is the real 
net costs incurred by the borrower in acquiring the loan. 'Ihese borrowing 
costs (BC) ma.y include three separate elerrEnts: the nominal interest payments 
(NI), additional loan transaction costs incurred by the borrower (TC), and 
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C changes in the purchasing power of money over the loan period (~P) . 2 '!hat 
c 
is, 
BC=NI+TC- 6P 
In most cases the borrower can accurately predict the NC and TC elements of 
his total borrowing costs. When overall price levels are changing, however, 
a borrower is forced to subjectively estimate the changes in the purchasing 
power of money over the life of the loan. The expected change in prices 
(AP*) probably have a direct relationship to the recent changes in purchas-
ing power of money experienced by the prospective borrowers [2]. The expected 
borrowing cost (BC*) used by the prospective borrower in making loan demand 
decisions would be equal to, 
BC* = NI + TC - ~P* 
Expected borrowing costs will only be equal to the nominal interest charges 
when other loan transaction costs are nil and borrowers do not expect the 
purchasing power of money to change over the life of the loan. As will be 
argued later, it is unlikely that many potential rural borrowers in low-incorre 
countries ignore these non-interest rate factors in making loan demand decisions. 
Borrower Transaction Costs 
Borrowers of small a.rrounts and individuals who do not have prior borrow-
ing experience with a prospective lender may incur relatively large transac-
tion costs to acquire a loan. At least three kinds of borrower transaction 
costs might be involved. These include: (1) loan charges collected by the 
lender beyond interest payments through such things as application fees, 
2 If loans are granted and repaid in kind the purchasing power element is 
not relevant. 
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forced purchase of other lender services, service fees, bribes, compensatory 
balances, and closing costs. 'Ihe lender may also raise the borrower's trans-
action costs by deducting interest. charges in advance or collecting interest 
on the entire loan even though only part is withdrawn by the borrower. 
(2) In many low-income countries the rural poor may be forced to negotiate 
with sorreone outside the formal lending agency before a loan application is 
fonnally reviewed. fuis individual may be an extension agent, a local offi-
cial or leader, or a cosigner. In sorre cases a potential borrower must pay 
expenses for a technician to visit and inventory the borrower's farm operation. 
Gifts and bribes may be involved in sorre of these cases. (3) In many cases, 
the largest and most important transaction costs are the borrower's tlire and 
travel expenses involved in the loan transaction. Many small and new borrowers 
are required to visit the formal lender a number of tlires to negotiate the loan, 
withdraw portions of the loan, and make repayrrent. Sorre of these visits may 
involve waiting in line for long periods and traveling long distances. Lost 
work tlire may becorre quite important, especially when loan transactions are 
concentrated in planting and harvesting periods when the opportunity costs of 
the borrower's labor are substantial. 
Changes in Purchasing Power of Money 
Price increases have been very severe in low-incorre countries the past 
few years. 'Ihe International Monetary Funds reports average weighted changes 
in consumer prices for all low-income countries in excess of 20 percent per 
year since 1972. fuis inflation corrbined with inflexible nominal interest 
rate policies have resulted in close to zero or negative real rates of interest 
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C (RI) on most formal agricultural loans in almost all low-income countries.3 
c 
Borrowers in several inflation-riddled countries in Latin Arrerica refer to 
such loans as "sweet money." A borrower who incurs relatively small loan 
transaction costs is strongly drawn to these sweet money loans. Part of the 
attraction is the implied income transfer involved in receiving and repaying 
a loan at negative real rates of interest. An alert borrower can realize 
this income transfer by investing borrowed funds in real assets or goods 
which increase in price with inflation, and later sell the goods and repay 
the lender less purchasing power than was borrowed. 
It is unlikely that a borrower adjusts borrowing cost expectation when 
short-term, unexpected surges of inflation occur. Persistent inflation or 
deflation, however, undoubtedly cause borrowers to include expected price 
changes in the calculations of expected borrowing costs. 
Farm-Household 1.evel Information 
It is difficult to docurrent the relative importance of borrower transac-
tion costs and expected changes in the purchasing power of money in loan de-
mand decisions. We know of no research which reports on how expected changes 
in the purchasing of money affects borrowing decisions in rural areas. There 
are also surprisingly few farm-level studies which docurrent borrower transac-
ti on costs. We have found only three studies which touch on this issue: one 
in Bangladesh, another in Brazil, and one in Colombia. Despite the limited 
3 The real rate of interest is defined as being equal to 1 + NI - 1 where 
1 +& 
NI is the nominal rate of interest, and /iP is the annual change in some 
selected price index. 
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coverage of these studies, they give sorre valuable insigpts into the relative 
inportance and make-up of borrowers' transaction costs. 
Bang1adesh Case 
In the early 1960's, Shahjahan and associates studied credit use among 
more than 2,500 fa.rners in what is now Bangladesh. A part of this study 
gathered informa.tion on sorre of the borTower transaction costs incurred in 
getting loans from the Agricultural Developrrent Bank of Pakistan. During the 
period of the study the Bank charged a uniform seven percent nominal interest 
rate on all loans. BorTowers probably expected the purchasing power of money 
to be more or less constant since veY'J little change in consumer prices oc-
curred in Pakistan during the early 1960's. 
The borrower transaction costs detailed in the study included application 
fees, form filling fees, loan registration fees, borrower's traveling expenses, 
costs of "entertaining" people who assisted the fa.:rn19r in getting the loan, 
and the opportunity cost of the borrower's tine used in negotiating the loan. 
Unfortunately, the study did not provide information on the average duration 
of the loans studied. It is likely, however, that the average term of the 
loans was between 6 and 12 months. 
In Table 1, we present information on the actual average loan transaction 
costs for various loan size groups. We also present calculated interest pay-
rrents for hypothetical loans of both 6-month and 12-month duration. Borrowers 
of a 12-month loan are assumed to pay twice as much interest as borrowers of 
equal amounts for only 6 months. Since transaction costs are more or less 
fixed for a given loan, the effective annualized cost of borrowing a given 
amount at a fixed interest rate decreases as the duration of the loan is 
lengthened. 
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TABLE 1: FarrrEr Costs of Borrow1ng in Bangladesh from the 
Agricultural Developm:mt :&lnk in 1962-63 by Loan-Size Groups 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Aver- I.Dan Trans- Interest Interest Interest Costs as Effective 
age action Costs if Costs if a Percent of Annualized Costs 
Size Costs of Loan Held Loan Held 5or Total Borrowing of Borrowing as 
Loanl of for 6 
Months2 
12 Months Costs Percent of Loan 
wan for 6 for 12 for ~ for 12 
!Vbnths Months Months 1Vbnths4 
In 1963 Rupees5 % % % % 
50 16.73 1. 75 3.50 9 17 74 40 
150 25.54 5.25 10.50 17 29 41 24 
250 30.10 8.75 17.50 22 36 32 19 
350 38.18 12.25 24.50 24 39 29 18 
450 43.59 15.75 31.50 27 42 26 17 
550 70.62 19.25 38.50 21 35 33 20 
650 56.20 22.75 45.50 29 45 24 16 
800 67.10 28.00 56.00 29 45 24 15 
1000 67.51 35.00 70.00 34 51 21 14 
1300 68.58 45.50 91.00 40 57 18 12 
Source: Adapted from Shahjahan, p. 77. 
1 Includes application fees, form filling and registration fees, costs for travel 
and entertainrrEnt related to acquiring the loan, and value of borrower time 
spent in negotiating the loan. 
2 In 1962-63 the Agricultural DeveloprrentBank of Pakistan charged 7 percent 
annually on all agricultural loans. 
3 Columns two plus three divided by column one and multiplied by a factor of 
two to convert to an annual rate. 
4 Columns two plus four divided by column one. 
5 In 1963 the exchange rate of rupees for one U.S. dollar was 4.792. 
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As can be noted in Table 1, interest payments made up less than half the 
total borrowing costs in most loan-size groups for loans of both six and 
12-months duration. For the smallest loan, interest paynents made up only 
nine percent of total borrowing cost on a six-month loan and only 17 percent 
on a 12-:rronth loan. Interest payrrents were a much larger part of total bor-
rowing costs for borrowers in the largest loan-size group. On a six-month 
loan, interest paynents made up 40 percent of borrowing costs and 57 percent 
on a 12-month loan. 
The effective annualized costs of borrowing, as a percent of the total 
amount borrowed, are presented in columns seven and eight of Table 1. As can 
be noted, the rates drop sharply as the size of loan increases. A borrower 
of 50 rupees (about $10 U.S.) incurred annualized borrowing costs equal to 
74 percent of a six-month loan and 40 percent on a 12-rnonth loan. For the 
sane periods, borrowers of formal loans worth 1,300 rupees (about $270 U.S.) 
faced effective rates of only 18 and 12 percent respectively. 
Brazilian Case 
In a 1971 study, Nehman analyzed borrowing costs am::mg a sarrple of 150 
farrrers in the State of Sao Paulo, Brazil. Small fa.rrrers made up about half 
the total sarrple. Approximately one-third of all farmers interviewed had for-
mal loans. The average nominal rate of interest on these formal loans was 
about 13 percent, but ranged from 7 to 16 percent per year. These rates in-
cluded a standard service fee which was added to most loans. The borrower's 
loan transaction costs included loan registration fees, farm appraisal costs 
covered by the potential borrower, and the borrower's ti.rre and travel costs 
involved in negotiating, acquiring and repaying the loan. As in the Bangladesh 
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C study, Nehman found that for most small and new borrowers, the tine lost in 
negotiating the loan made up a very large part of total borrower transaction 
c 
costs. He found that ffi311Y new or small borrowers were required to visit the 
formal lender 5 to 7 tines to complete all loan transactions. 
Unlike Bangladesh, borrowers in Brazil were highly sensitized to changes 
in the purchasing power of money. Annual changes in consurrer price indexes 
have exceeded the nominal interest charges on formal agricultural loans every 
year for several decades. Between 1960 and 1971, these annual price changes 
ranged from 20 to 95 percent. An unweighted average of the annual rates of 
inflation exceed 40 percent over this period. No attempt was made in the 
Nehman study to ID2asure borrowers' expectations about price changes. It would 
be very surprising, however, if these expected price changes were less than 
20 percent, especially among the economically sophisticated borrower. 
The figures in Table 2 sumnarize the borrowing cost information collected 
by Nehman. The information is presented by borrower's farm size. As can be 
noted, the loans were much larger than those reported in the Bangladesh case. 
Borrowers in the smallest farm-size group acquired an average of 680 cruzeiros 
( $136 U.S. ) , while borrowers in the largest farm-size category averaged 6, 871 
cruzeiros ($1,374 U.S.) in formal loans. Most of the formal loans, especially 
to small and ID2dium-sized farmers, were for a single crop period of 5 to 6 
months. As in the Bangladesh case, we assurre two average loan duration periods 
in order to estimate nominal interest paYffi2nts. We also assume an average 
nominal rate of 13 percent in making the interest paYffi2nt calculations. 4 
4 Major differences among loan durations, uneven interest and loan repayrrent 
schedules, and loan repayment performance made it impractical to use actual 
interest payments made during the year as a ID2asure of nominal interest charges. 
TABLE 2: Farmer Costs of Borrowing from Formal Sources 
in State of Sao Paulo, Brazil in 1971 by Farm Size Groups 
1 
Farm Size in 
Hectaresl/ 
0-20 
21-50 
Over 50 
2 
Average Form-
al Loan Size 
3 
Avg. Trans-
'3.Ction Costs of 
Getting Loan 
-In 1971 Cruzeiros21-
680.00 
3665.00 
6871.00 
109.00 
178.oo 
144.oo 
Source: Adaptation of Nehman, p. 78. 
1/ One hectare equals 2.47 acres. 
4 r-) 
Noffiinal lnter\::st P.:w-
ment on Loans Held f~r..Y 
6 Months 12 Months 
44.20 
238.23 
446.62 
8e.4o 
476.45 
893. 23 
2/ In 1971 one cruzeiro equaled 20 cents U.S. 
6 7 H 9 
lnLt~n-~st Chai·ge:_1 l\.t111uall~t:J 1Jl1-eot Costs 
as Percent of of Borrowing as 
Direct Costs of Percent of 
Borrowing Loan Value 
Mon~-s 4/-- Mo~~~: 5/ - Mo~hs 6/- -Mo~~hs 7 I 
29 
57 
76 
-Percent-
45 
73 
86 
44 
22 
18 
29 
18 
15 
].! Assumes that an average nominal interest rate of 13 percent per year was charged on loan. 
4/ Colurm 4 divided by colurm 3 plus 4. 
5/ Column 5 divided by 3 plus 5. 
6/ Columns 3 plus 4 divided by colurm 2 and multiplied by 2 to convert to annual rate. 
- . 
7 I Colurms 3 plus 5 divided by column 2. 
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C The average borrower's transaction costs for getting formal loans, shown 
c 
in Table 2, are most interesting figures. As can be noted, borrowers in the 
smallest farm-size group incurred average loan transaction costs equal to 
109 cruzeiros to acquire an average loan of 680 cruzeiros. At the same time, 
borrowers in the largest farm-size group with loans which averaged 10 tinEs 
more in value incurred average loan transaction costs which were only sligptly 
larger (144 cruzeiros). Some of the largest borrowers in the sample, espec-
ially those who had previous dealings with the formal lender, incurred almost 
no loan transaction costs. In some of these cases a single telephone call 
from the borrower to the lender and one visit to the bank was sufficient to 
negotiate the loan. 
As in the Bangladesh study the interest charges, as a percent of total 
direct costs of borrowing, ig,noring for the moment the changes in the purchas-
ing power of money, increased with the size of loan. On a six-month loan, 
interest pa.ynEnts ma.de up only 29 percent of direct borrowing costs while on 
a 12-month loan they ma.de up 45 percent. At the same time the largest borrowers 
paid 76 percent and 86 percent respectively of their direct costs of borrowing 
in nominal interest payments. 
The annualized direct costs of borrowing as a percent of loan value varied 
inversely with loan size. The smallest borrowers faced rates of 44 percent on 
6-rnonth loans and 29 percent on 12-month borrowings. The largest borrowers 
experienced rates of 18 percent and 15 percent respectively. For purposes of 
comparison, Nehma.n also researched the costs of borrowing from inforrml lenders 
in the area of his study. He found that, althougtl nominal interest charges on 
informal loans ranged from 3-4 per month, borrowers of informal loans felt they 
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incurred very little additional transaction costs. He also found that small 
to mediwn borrowers were often indifferent as to whether to seek a form:i.l or 
inform:i.l loan because they felt their total costs of acquiring a loan from 
either source were very similar. 
To this point we have ignored changes in the purchasing power of :rroney 
in calculating borrowing costs in Brazil. It would.be quite conservative to 
assume that :rrost borrowers in Brazil expected price changes of at least 20 
percent per year. If this were the case, large borrowers would expect to 
realize negative real annualized borrowing costs on both 6 and 12-month loans, 
medium-sized borrowers would expect real borrowing costs to be close to zero, 
and small borrowers would expect real borrowing costs to be positive and sub-
stantial. If one assumes that large borrowers are better able to anticipate 
inflation than less sophisticated small borrowers, expected price changes among 
large borrowers may in fact be higher than for small borrowers. In the Brazil-
ian context a large borrower may anticipate inflation will continue at rates 
of 30 to 40 percent per year. This would make the expected borrowing costs 
for large borrowers even :rrore highly negative and thus make form:i.l loans :rrore 
attractive to them. 
Colombian Case 
Villamil studied credit among 63 fanrers in the central part of Colombia. 
All of the fanrers in his sample operated less than 20 hectares of land, and 
most operated less than 10 hectares. The area studied is typical of many low-
income farming areas clinging to the mountain sides in Colombia. The study 
reports on credit use and costs of acquiring credit for 1972-73. The borrower's 
loan transaction costs included costs for paperwork, opportunity costs of the 
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C borrower's tine used to negotiate the loan, travel expenses incurred by the 
borrower to negotiate the loan, costs of obtaining a cosigner, and borrower 
costs to have a technician survey his farm activities. Villamil paid no at-
tention to changes in the purchasing power of rroney in his analysis. It is 
highly likely, however, that borrowers expected sorre decline in the purchas-
ing power of money. Over the 1960-73 period, annual changes in consUirer 
price indexes ranged from 3 to 32 percent in Colombia. An unweighted average 
change of about 12 percent per year resulted over this period. One might ex-
pect borrowers to anticipate inflation rates of at least 5 to 10 percent per 
year under these conditions. 
'Ihe study showed that about 30 percent of the nun:ber of loans held by 
the interviewed fa.rrrErs canE from forrml sources. These fo:rnial loans made up 
45 percent of the total rurount borrowed by the entire sample. Most of the 
C fa.rrrers borrowed from both formal and informal sources. Farrrers, nevertheless, 
were getting rruch less formal credit than they requested. Their extensive use 
of informal credit was partly due to lack of formal credit, but also due to 
the substantial borrowing costs associated with using formal sources. Although 
nominal interest rates on formal loans only averaged 13 percent, Villamil found 
these interest payments only made up 30 percent of the costs of borrowing on 
the average. On an annualized basis, and ignoring expected changes in the 
purchasing power of money, he found the average borrower incurred total fo:rnial 
borrowing costs equal to 42 percent of the total value of their fo:rnial loans. 
This percentage was only moderately lower than the average 47 percent which 
borrowers expended in acquiring all loans, both formal and informal. As in the 
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Bangladesh and Brazilian cases, small and new borrowers experienced higher 
annualized borrowing costs for their formal loans than did larger borrowers 
in the sample. 
Costs For New Borrowers 
The studies by Shahjahan, Nehman and Villamil report on borrowing costs 
mainly arrong farmers who have previous formal borrowing experience. One 
might expect that an individual who has not previously borrowed from a formal 
lender would face higher loan transaction costs than an established borrower. 
Furthermore, not all applicants for formal credit receive a formal loan. 
Many of these unsuccessful applicants incur significant formal loan transac-
tion costs before being rejected. A~er rejection they may be forced to seek 
informal loans. 'Ihe expected borrowing costs of a new formal loan applicant 
may be increased by these possibilities of formal loan rejection. 'Ihese re-
jection costs may be quite irrportant if the probability of getting a new for-
mal loan application approved are relatively low. The information in Table 3 
is a hypothetical case which illustrates the in:portance of these relatively 
large transaction costs for new borrowers and also the irrportance of rejection 
costs. The various assurrptions used in the example are based on some en:pir-
ical results from Nehman's Brazilian study. 
We assl.,!IJ'E in Table 3 that a farmer who has never borrowed from a specific 
formal lender is interested in a 12-month loan for $100, and that he can be 
absolutely sure of getting the loan irmediately with no additional transaction 
costs from an informal lender who lives nearby (Option I) . The informal lender 
charges an interest rate, however, of 48 percent per year. At the same tirre, 
the fa.mer also has the opportunity of applying for an identical loan from a 
c 
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TABLE 3: Hypothetical Options for a New Borrower 
to Obtain a Small Loan 
Option III 
Tuforrna.l Lender 
Option I Option II After Formal 
Assurrptions Informal Lender Formal Lender Rejection 
Loan Size 
Loan Terni 
Loan Transaction Costs Before 
Approved or Rejection 
Probability of Getting Loan 
Nominal Interest Rate 
Expected Changes in Purchasing 
Power of Money 
$100 
12 :roonths 
0 
1.0 
48% 
0 
After-Approval Loan Transaction Costs 0 
Effective Annual Borrowing Costs $ 48 
Expected Borrowing Costs of 
Option II and/or III 
Source: Adaptation of data collected by Nehman. 
$100 $100 
12 :roonths 12 m:mths 
$ 16 $ 16 
.5 1.0 
12% 48% 
0 0 
$ 16 0 
$ 44 $ 64 
(44+64).5=$54 
• 
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formal lender who is located some distance from the fa.mer (Option II) . The ~ 
interest rate on the formal loan is only 12 percent per year, but the appli-
cant knows that because of excess demand the probability of a new applicant 
getting a loan is only • 5. Furthermore, the applicant knows it will cost him 
$16 in lost work, travel expenses, and paperwork associated with the loan ap-
plication before a yes or no decision is made on the loan. The applicant 
also knows that if the loan is approved it will take another $16 in loan trans-
action costs to corrplete the loan, withdraw payrrents and make repayrrent. As-
suming there is no expected change in the purchasing power of m:mey, the an-
nualized costs of borrowing under Option II, assuming the loan application is 
approved, is 44 percent per year. 
A new loan applicant probably recognizes, however, that only half the 
new applicants get formal loans. The applicant also understands that he rray 
end up spending $16 to apply for a fo:rnial loan, have his application rejected, 
and end up paying an informal lender $48 to borrow $100. If the farmer is 
forced into this Option III, his annualized borrowing costs would be 64 per-
cent. Given the assurrption in Table 3, the expected annualized costs for a 
new formal loan applicant who selects Option II and/or III, would be 54 per-
cent of the $100 loan [(44 + 64) x .5]. In this particular example, the 
farmer would have a lower expected cost of borrowing if he selected the in-
formal lender (Option I) rather than take his chances with the formal lender. 
The example in Table 3 can be made much more corrplex by changing sorre of 
the sirrplifying assumptions. In sorre cases, for example, the probability of 
obtaining 8.n informal loan may be less than 1.0, and there also may be infor-
mal loan transaction costs for the borrower. Also, the probability of getting 
an infonna.l loan may decrease if the borrower first applies tb a formal lender. 
c 
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Inflation or deflation expectations rrd.ght also be added to the exanple. If 
loans are made and repaid in cash, expected changes in overall prices would 
have no effect on the relative desirability of formal versus inforrral loans, 
as long as the real costs of borrowing both types of loans were positive. 
If these two assurrptions are not satisfied, the relative attractiveness of 
the two loan sources rrd.ght be altered by expected price changes. other 
things being equal, expected price increases would make loans made and repaid 
in kind less desirable. 
The relative desirability of boITowing from forrral and informal sources 
can be altered substantially by changing the various assurrptions included in 
Table 3. These assurrptions, however~ appear to be reasonable at least in 
the Brazilian context, and show that new borrowers and borrowers of small 
amounts may be very rational in deciding to use informal credit sources. Nom-
inal interest rates on formal loans may be nru.ch less important to these types 
of potential borrowers than are boITower transaction costs, the dignity and 
speed with which the lender treats the borrower, the probabilities of getting 
a loan, and assurances that additional credit will be available in cases of 
errergency. 
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Conclusions 
The limited scope of the errpirical inform9.tion presented in this article 
restricts the firm policy recorrmendations which can be drawn. Additional 
research is needed to clarify the importance of loan transaction costs and 
expectations about changes in the purchasing power of ITDney in farmers' 
loan demand decisions. Some tentative policy conclusions appear warrented, 
however, to guide future research. 
The ITDst important conclusion which we draw from this information is 
that/borrower loan transaction costs above and beyond nominal interest payrrEnts 
l. 
~ may be an important factor discouraging small and new borrowers from using 
formal loans~ These loan transaction costs appear to make up a very large 
part of borrowing costs for many small and rredium-sized borrowers. In re la-
tive terms, these loan transaction costs appear to be much less important for 
large and experienced borrowers. These large borrowers may be much ITDre sen-
sitive to nominal interest charges and expected changes in the purchasing 
power of money. One should not be surprised in a country like Brazil where 
inflation pressures are strong and steady, that large experienced borrowers 
are willing to absorb alITDst unlimited amounts of concessionally priced loans. 
Their loan transaction costs per unit of ITDney borrowed are quite small, the 
nominal interest rates are much lower than the borrower's expectation about 
future price increases, and the expected borrowing costs for most large and 
experienced borrowers are negative in real terms. At the sarre tirre, one 
should not be surprised to find small and new formal borrowers much less en-
thusiastic about using formal credit, even thougtl they may be charged lower 
nominal interest rates than large borrowers. Paperwork costs, expenses of 
c 
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visiting the bank a number of tines to negotiate the loan, and probabilities 
that the loan application will be rejected, increase small borrowers expected 
loan transaction costs and expected total borrowing costs. For these indi vid-
uals, the borrowing costs of concessionally priced formal credit may be higher 
than borrowing costs from the much maligned, "usurious" m:mey lender. 
'Ihe policy inplications of major differences annng various classes of bor-
rowers in the inportance of the various elerrents of borrowing costs are fairly 
obvious. Adjustments in nominal interest rates will have a weak direct effect 
on borrowing costs of small and new borrowers. Changes in loan transaction 
costs may have a much more important impact on their borrowing decisions. At 
the same tine, loan demand annng large and experienced borrowers will be much 
rrore sensitive to changes in real rates of interest. 
If a society's goal is to reach more rural poor through formal loans, 
borrower transaction costs must be reduced. Since the opportunity costs and 
travel expenses are relatively large for small borrowers, initial attention 
might be directed at reducing travel expenses and the number of visits required. 
Group loans, mobile banks, and locating small branches of banks in small vil-
lages may be partial solutions. In many cases, however, it appears that for-
mal lenders irrpose substantial loan transaction costs on small and new borrowers 
as a wa:y of keeping unprofitable business away from the bank. As Gonzalez-Vega 
has pointed out, concessional interest rate policies on agricultural credit com-
bined with relatively high lender costs of naking small loans cause banks to 
direct loans to large borrowers. Higher nominal interest rates might cause 
these large borrowers to demand less loans, provide more profit rmrgin for 
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lenders to service s:rmll and new borrowers, and cause lenders to sirrplify 
lending procedures so that borrowing costs of small and new lenders were re-
duced. Under these conditions the formal lender might be forced to adopt 
some of the borrowing conveniences offered by informal lenders. The net 
result of increasing nominal interest rates on agricultural loans may be to 
reduce the forrna.l loan borrowing costs for the rural poor. That is, with 
higher interest rates lenders may adopt new lending procedures which reduce 
borrower loan transaction costs more than nominal interest payrrents increase. 
The problems of extending forrna.l financial services to the· rural poor 
in low-income countries are difficult and tenacious. It will take rrn.lch .more 
than pressure f'rom international agencies, government exhortation, or good 
intentions on the part of a few forrna.l lenders to resolve these problems. 
Repayment perforrrance on loans to rural poor must be irrproved and lender trans-
action costs of making small loans must also be reduced. Sorre policies, es-
pecially those related to interest rates, must be adjusted so that ma.king 
s:rmll loans to the rural poor is more attractive to formal lenders. We feel 
that attention also rrn.lst be focused on ma.king forrna.l loans more attractive to 
s:rmll and new borrowers by reducing borTowers' loan transaction costs. It 
may be very difficult to do this if governments insist on pursuing low inter-
est rate policies on loans for the rural poor. 
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